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Abstract Negative feedback can signal poor performance,
but it also provides information that can help learners reach
thegoalof task mastery.The primary aimofthisstudy was to
test the hypothesis that the amount of information provided
by negative feedback during a paired-associate learning task
influences feedback-related processing in the caudate nucle-
us. To do this, we manipulated the number of response
options: With two options, positive and negative feedback
provide equal amounts of information, whereas with four
options, positive feedback provides more information than
does negative feedback. We found that positive and negative
feedback activated the caudate similarly when there were
two response options. With four options, the caudate’s re-
sponse to negative feedback was reduced. A secondary goal
was to investigate the link between brain-based measures of
feedback-related processing and behavioral indices of learn-
ing. Analysis of the posttest measures showed that trials with
positive feedback were associated with higher posttest con-
fidence ratings. Additionally, when positive feedback was
delivered, caudate activity was greater for trials with high
than with low posttest confidence. This experiment demon-
strated the context sensitivity of feedback processing and
provided evidence that feedback processing in the striatum
can contribute to the strengthening of the representations
available within declarative memory.
Keywords Learning.Motivation.Caudate.Prefrontal
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Feedback-based learning involves making use of the infor-
mation provided by the consequences of one’s actions. The
caudate nucleus, which has been implicated in processing
information about extrinsic rewards and punishments, such
as monetary gains and losses (Delgado, Locke, Stenger, &
Fiez, 2003; Delgado, Nystrom, Fissell, Noll, & Fiez, 2000;
Mullette-Gillman, Detwiler, Winecoff, Dobbins, & Huettel,
2011; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007), responds in
very similar manners to the intrinsic rewards and punish-
ments of positive and negative feedback indicating correct
and incorrect performance, respectively, with an increase in
signal in response to positive feedback, and a decrease in
signal to negative feedback (Tricomi, Delgado, McCandliss,
McClelland, & Fiez, 2006). Thus, in typical studies involv-
ing feedback-based learning, the brain responses associated
with rewards are evoked by positive feedback, and
responses associated with punishments are evoked by neg-
ative feedback (Elliott, Frith, & Dolan, 1997; Poldrack et al.,
2001; Seger & Cincotta, 2005; Tricomi et al., 2006; Ull-
sperger & von Cramon, 2003). However, during learning
tasks, negative feedback can provide useful information that
can help a learner reach the goal of task mastery. Thus, if the
definition of “reward” is expanded beyond extrinsic rewards
to include any outcome that can serve as a goal of behavior,
information itself can then be construed as a reward if it aids
in goal attainment. Thus, negative feedback could actually
act as a “reward,” rather than as a punishment or the absence
of an expected reward. In this case, the response of brain
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might be expected to reflect the amount of information
provided by the feedback, rather than the valence of the
feedback. Our experiment was designed to examine how the
amount of information provided by feedback influences the
way that the feedback is processed by the brain.
Information can be thought of as the deviation of an
outcome from expectation or as a reduction in uncertainty
(Shannon, 1948). When an outcome is fully predicted, it
provides no information, whereas if there is a low probabil-
ity that any given action is the correct one, positive feedback
then provides a large amount of information. Phasic changes
in the firing of dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain have
been found to correspond to “prediction error” signals; that
is, phasic changes encode the difference between a reward
received and an expected reward (Schultz & Dickinson,
2000). Unexpected rewards produce the most neuronal ac-
tivity; in contrast, the lack of an expected reward leads to a
negative prediction error, and to a corresponding dip in
dopaminergic firing rates (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague,
1997). More recent evidence, however, has presented a
more complex picture of the functions of dopamine neurons.
In addition to neurons coding for reward prediction error,
other dopamine neurons fire in response to both liquid
rewards and aversive air puffs to the eye, when these are
unpredictable, and to stimuli predicting both of these out-
comes (Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009). Furthermore, dopa-
mine neurons and lateral habenula neurons, which influence
dopamine neuron activity, have been found to encode “in-
formation prediction errors” in addition to reward prediction
errors (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2011). That is, these
neurons appear to code for the value of information in a way
that is analogous to the value of primary rewards, with
increases in firing to the unexpected delivery of information
or to cues linked with information delivery, and decreases in
firing to denial of reward information. Thus, it is possible
that the informational value of negative feedback could
cause it to elicit an increase in dopamine neuron firing,
despite its “negative” valence.
Akeytargetofdopaminergicneuronsisthestriatum,which
in recent years has been heavily implicated in reward process-
ing (Delgado, 2007;O ’Doherty, 2004). Previous work indicat-
ed that reward-related activation of the caudate nucleus, a
structure within the dorsal striatum, is very context dependent
(e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). In some cases, the same
outcome can produce differing amounts of blood-
oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) activation in the stria-
tum, depending on how the outcome is interpreted—or, in
otherwords,itssubjectivevalue.Forexample,astasksbecome
well learned and positive feedback provides less information,
caudate activation is attenuated (Delgado, Miller, Inati, &
Phelps, 2005; Haruno et al., 2004; Law et al., 2005). Other
factors, such as a sense of agency (Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez,
2004), the delay to receive a reward (Kable & Glimcher, 2007;
McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004), and wheth-
er an outcome is framed as a loss or a gain (Tom et al., 2007),
also affect the degree to which the striatum is activated. The
perceived value of an outcome is also affected by the other
possible outcomes. Studies of “counterfactual comparisons”
have indicated that reward-related brain regions respond to an
outcome’s value relative to the alternative outcomes, rather
than to its absolute value (Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale,
& Shizgal, 2001; Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague,
2007; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Ursu & Carter, 2005). For
example, earning no money when the alternative is losing
money produces a greater response in the caudate than when
the alternative is winning money (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005).
Similarly, in a design that allowed participants to discover not
only what the earnings resulting from their choices were, but
also what their earnings would have been if they had chosen
differently,activationinthestriatumwasfoundtobecorrelated
with the “fictive error signal” provided by the information
about the unchosen outcome (Lohrenz et al., 2007). Impor-
tantly, these studies demonstrated that the magnitude of
reward-related changes in the caudate is influenced by the
relative values of the possible outcomes.
Other research has demonstrated that the caudate will even
become activated by responses that are independent of exter-
nal reward presentation (Han, Huettel, Raposo, Adcock, &
Dobbins, 2010; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2011; Zink, Pagnoni,
Martin, Dhamala, & Berns, 2003). For example, caudate
activationhasbeenshowntobeelicitedbytask-relevanttarget
detection and by recognition of previously viewed images in
an old–new memory task (Han et al., 2010; Mullette-Gillman
et al., 2011). Additionally, “model-based” knowledge of task
structure has been shown to influence striatal activity, demon-
strating that the striatum is sensitive to complex cognitive
information (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan,
2011). Taken together, these experiments suggested that a
subjective sense of goal achievement may be as important
for activating the caudate as the absolute reward value of an
outcome (Han et al., 2010; Tricomi & Fiez, 2008). Thus,
subtle contextual differences in experimental paradigms can
sometimes lead to different patterns of activation in the
caudate.
A previous experiment indicated that when positive and
negative feedback provide equal amounts of information
and do not indicate task success, little activation is observed
in the caudate nucleus and no differences in caudate activa-
tion occur for positive versus negative feedback (Tricomi &
Fiez, 2008). That study did not address, however, whether
the caudate would become active if positive and negative
feedback provided differing amounts of information. In this
context, positive and negative feedback could be seen as
having different values relative to one another, which could
drive caudate activation. We tested this idea by using a
362 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2012) 12:361–372feedback-based word association task similar to one used
previously (Tricomi & Fiez, 2008), with the exception that
the amount of information provided by the feedback was
manipulated by altering the number of response options.
In this new task variation, participants chose which of
several word options correctly formed a pair with a target
word. The pairs were arbitrary, so that it was impossible for
participants to discern the correct answer in advance of feed-
back. With only two response options, positive and negative
feedback provided equal amounts of information about the
correct answer; if the feedback was positive, the response
chosen was correct, whereas if the feedback was negative,
theresponsenotchosenwascorrect.However,withmorethan
two response options, positive feedback provided more infor-
mation about the correct answer than did negative feedback,
because the correct answer could not be deduced from nega-
tive feedback. If caudate activity tracks the informational
content of feedback, regardless of its valence, negative feed-
back should produce activation similar to that for positive
feedback when there are two choices, but should produce less
activation than positive feedback when there are more than
two choices. To test this hypothesis, we examined brain acti-
vation related to receiving feedback when either two or four
response options were available to participants.
A secondary goal of this experiment was to investigate the
link between brain-based measures of feedback processing
and behavioral indices of learning and memory. Of particular
interest was the question of whether the caudate, a brain
region that is typically associated with reinforcement-based
learning and the formation of procedural memories (Dayan &
Balleine, 2002;G r a y b i e l ,1995; Packard & Knowlton, 2002),
may contribute to the mastery of new declarative knowledge.
The paired-associate learning task that forms the basis for the
present experiment is traditionally regarded as a task in which
learning necessitates the involvement of a medial temporal
lobe system that contributes to the formation of new declara-
tive knowledge and to the encoding of episodic experiences
(Law et al., 2005; Meltzer & Constable, 2005). However,
there is growing recognition that memory performance can
reflect the combined influences of multiple memory systems,
each of which may contribute different types of learning
signals that can promote task mastery (Dickerson, Li, &
Delgado, 2011; Mattfeld & Stark, 2011; Sadeh, Shohamy,
Levy, Reggev, & Maril, 2011; Tricomi & Fiez, 2008). In line
with this view, in a previous experiment involving a similar
paired-associate learning task (Tricomi & Fiez, 2008), we
found evidence that brain activation in a number of regions
during an initial encoding experience predicted the accuracy
of subsequent memory retrieval events. The identified regions
overlapped with those reported in prior investigations of sub-
sequent memory effects and included regions associated with
declarativememoryprocessing(e.g.,leftinferiorfrontalgyrus
and left fusiform gyrus). The standard subsequent memory
effect was not observed in the striatum, but an exploratory
analysis indicated that the magnitude of caudate activation
duringtrialswithpositivefeedbackwas associatedwithfuture
reaction time decreases in response to the same stimuli. These
findings were taken as preliminary evidence that the caudate
may contribute to the “proceduralization” of declarative
knowledge. The present study provided an opportunity to
determine whether a link between caudate activation and the
formation of declarative knowledge can be replicated.
Method
Participants
A group of 19 healthy, right-handed adults were recruited
through posted advertisements and were paid $60 for their
participation in the study. The analysis included data from
16 of these participants (11 women, 5 men; mean age ± SD:
22.9 ± 1.9); the data from the other 3 participants were
excluded due to a program error (2 participants) or to ex-
cessive head motion (1 participant). All of the participants
gave informed consent according to the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Pittsburgh.
Materials
A 3-tesla Siemens head-only scanner and standard radio fre-
quency coil were used for all of the magnetic resonance
scanning sessions. Stimulus presentation and behavioral data
acquisition were controlled using E-Prime software
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) and the Integrated
Function Imaging System (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.,
Pittsburgh, PA).
Procedure
Scan session Structural images were collected using a stan-
dard T1-weighted pulse sequence, in 42 contiguous slices
(0.78125 × 0.78125 × 3.0 mm voxels) parallel to the AC–PC
line.Atotalof 38functionalimages were collectedinthesame
locations as the middle 38 structural slices (3.125 × 3.125 ×
3.0 mm voxels), providing full coverage of the cerebrum and
partial coverage of the cerebellum. A one-shot echo-planar
imaging (EPI) pulse sequence was used for image acquisition
(TR 0 2,000 ms, TE 0 25 ms, FOV 0 20 cm, flip angle 0 79°).
Behavioral paradigm This experiment involved a paired-
associate word learning task similar to the one used in our
previous work (Tricomi & Fiez, 2008). On each trial, par-
ticipants saw a target word and either two or four choices of
possible word matches, labeled as in a multiple-choice test
(Fig. 1). The words were matched for word length and
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and 1–2 syllables, had Kučera–Francis frequencies of 20–
650 words per million, and had imageability ratings of over
400 according to the MRC database (Coltheart, 1981). The
words presented on the same trial had a score of less than
0.2 on the latent semantic analysis similarity matrix
(Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998), indicating low semantic
relation, and they did not rhyme or begin with the same
letter. Participants were asked to guess which response word
went with the target word and to enter their response using
the appropriate button on a response glove. After a 6-s
response period, a feedback display was shown for 1-s to
indicate whether the guess was correct (three green check-
marks) or incorrect (three red Xs). Three white hyphens
were shown if no response was entered, and the trial was
excluded from later analysis. Participants were asked to use
the feedback to try to remember the correct word pairs. The
trial ended with a 13-s delay, indicated by a white fixation
cross in the center of the screen.
We presented a total of 60 trials with two response
options and 120 trials with four options, randomly inter-
mixed. The words used in the two conditions were
matched on all parameters (e.g., word length, number
of syllables, etc.). The experiment was designed such
that participants were correct on 50% of the trials with
two options and 25% of the trials with four options, to
ensure that participants encountered positive and negative
feedback in accordance with the laws of probability. The
positive- and negative-feedback trials were randomly
intermixed. This trial structure ensured that there were
at least 30 “correct” trials for each trial type, while
maintaining chance levels of performance. All 180 trials
were distinct, with no words repeating across trials.
Immediately following the scan, participants completed a
computerized posttest. Instead of the multiple-choice for-
mat, the participants saw the target word and the word they
had picked on the corresponding trial during the scan and
were asked to respond as to whether the pairing was correct
or incorrect. This procedure was used so that, for all trial
conditions, there were two possible responses, which
allowed for performance to be compared between the con-
ditions. The participants were not made aware of how the
words shown on the screen had been picked. Thus, although
correct memory for the feedback would lead to correct
performance on the posttest, the posttest did not explicitly
test memory for the feedback paired with the target item. No
feedback was given. Pairs from all 180 trials were presented,
in random order. The posttest was self-paced, and partici-
pants made confidence judgments following each trial by
choosing a number from 1 to 7 (1 0 complete guess,70
completely sure). Participants returned to the lab and com-
pleted the posttest a second time approximately one week
later (4–8 days following the scan session).
Data analysis
FMRI data The NeuroImaging Software package (NIS 3.5)
was used to analyze the fMRI data. The images were recon-
structed and corrected for participant motion with the Auto-
mated Image Registration software (AIR3.08; Woods, Cherry,
& Mazziotta, 1992). Runs with head motion that exceeded
4 mm or 4° in any direction were not used in the analysis. The
images were detrended to adjust for scanner drift within runs.
The structural images of each participant were stripped to
remove the skull and co-registered to a common reference
brain, chosen from among the participants (Woods, Mazziotta,
&C h e r r y ,1993). Functional images were transformed into the
same common space, normalized by a mean scaling of each
image to match the global mean image intensity across partic-
ipants,and smoothed usinga three-dimensional Gaussianfilter
(8-mm full width at half-maximum [FWHM]) to account for
anatomical differences between participants. This set of data
was then analyzed statistically.
Due to our a priori interest in the response of the caudate
nucleus to feedback, we performed an ANOVA on the trial
outcome phase (from the onset of feedback until the end of
the trial) for a priori spherical regions of interest (ROIs;
radius 0 5 mm) centered in the left head of the caudate
nucleus (−12, 8, 12) and the right head of the caudate
nucleus (12, 8, 12). These coordinates are based on the
Talairach Daemon database (Lancaster et al., 2000)a n d
have been used previously in the literature (e.g., Zink et
al., 2003). In addition, a whole-brain analysis was per-
formed on the fMRI data, through a repeated measures
three-way ANOVA with Participant as a random factor and
6-s
1-s
13-s
Fig. 1 Experimental Design. Each trial, a target word was presented,
along with options for possible word matches, labeled as in a multiple
choicetest.After a6-sresponseperiod,thedisplaywasreplacedwitha1-
s feedback display of 3 green √s, indicating a correct response, 3 red Xs,
indicating an incorrect response, or 3 white hypens, indicating that no
response was made. After a 13-s delay, with a screen showing a fixation
cross, the next trial began
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rect vs. incorrect), and Time Period (2-s time periods T1–
T10) as within-subjects factors. A voxel-wise significance
threshold of p < .001 was used to identify additional ROIs; a
contiguity threshold of 41 voxels was also applied as a
precaution against Type I errors (Forman et al., 1995). This
contiguity threshold was set using the AFNI AlphaSim
program (Cox, 1996), such that the mapwise probability of
a false detection remained lower than .05.
A subsequent memory analysis was performed to inves-
tigate whether levels of activation during the scanning ses-
sion could be associated with accuracy on the immediate
and delayed posttests. As in previous work (e.g., Wagner et
al., 1998), trials for which the correct answer was remem-
bered with high confidence on the posttest following the
scanning session were compared with trials corresponding
to subsequent incorrect responses. Trials were coded as
“high confidence” if the confidence score was greater than
or equal to 5 on the 7-point scale. A repeated measures
ANOVA was performed on the fMRI data with Participant
as a random factor and Posttest Accuracy (high confidence
correct vs. incorrect), and Time (2-s time periods T1–T10)
as within-subjects factors. Additionally, we had an a priori
hypothesis that caudate activity might predict future confi-
dence, based on our previous work (Tricomi & Fiez, 2008),
so we extracted the outcome phase data from our left- and
right-caudate a priori ROIs and compared the signal for
trials corresponding to high posttest confidence versus trials
corresponding to low posttest confidence (5–7 vs. 1–3o n
the 7-point scale) using a paired t test.
Behavioral data The behavioral data for the posttests were
analyzed in terms of accuracy, reaction time, and confidence
measures. We calculated d' scores for each participant for
each trial condition. Two-tailed t tests were used to deter-
mine whether performance exceeded chance for each trial
type, and to determine whether performance differed be-
tween the trial types. Repeated measures ANOVAs were
performed to see whether confidence differed across con-
ditions. Finally, a mixed model linear regression analysis of
reaction times on confidence, with Participant as a random
factor, was performed for each posttest to determine whether
differences in confidence judgments were associated with
differences in reaction times.
Results
Behavioral results
The behavioral data for the posttests were analyzed in terms
of accuracy, reaction time, and confidence measures. For the
immediate posttest, the average d' scores were 0.81 (SD 0
0.7) for the two-choice condition and 0.91 (SD 0 0.85) for
the four-choice condition. This performance was better than
chance for both conditions [t(15) 0 4.9, p < .001, for the
two-choice condition; t(15) 0 4.3, p < .001, for the four-
choice condition], indicating that learning had occurred. The
difference in performance between the conditions was not
significant [t(15) 0 −0.64, p 0 .53, two-tailed]. (We report d'
scores here to avoid problems related to response bias, but
this precluded us from examining accuracy separately for
positive- and negative-feedback trials; analyses of the raw
percentages correct for the individual conditions, however,
showed accuracy that was significantly above chance [p <
.05] for both positive and negative feedback in both the two-
choice and four-choice conditions.) Three of the participants
performed below chance for one of the conditions (two- or
four-choice), and none performed below chance for both
conditions. Exclusion of those 3 participants from the anal-
ysis did not affect the results; therefore, we report the results
with all participants included.
The average confidence judgment score (out of 7) on the
immediate posttest was 4.5 (SD 0 1.0). A repeated measures
three-way ANOVA indicated a main effect of feedback type
[F(1,16.4)029.4,p<.001],amaineffectofposttestaccuracy
[F(1, 15.5) 0 31.6, p < .001], and a Trial Type × Feedback
Type × Posttest Accuracy interaction [F(1, 17.5) 0 4.8, p 0
.04] on the confidence ratings. As is shown in Fig. 2,c o n f i -
dence was higher for accurate than for inaccurate posttest
responses [t(15) 0 3.3, p 0 .004, two-tailed]. For the trials
drawn from the two-choice condition, confidence was higher
for posttest item pairs on which the participant had received
Condition effects on confidence judgments
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Fig. 2 Behavioral Results from the Immediate Post-test. Mean confi-
dence scores (normalized to the subject mean) were higher for accurate
trials than inaccurate trials and higher for trials for which participants
received positive feedback rather than negative feedback during the
scan. For accurate trials, the latter effect was more pronounced for the
4-choice condition than the 2-choice condition
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2012) 12:361–372 365positive feedback (i.e., made a correct choice) during the scan
than for posttest item pairs on which the participant had
received negative feedback (i.e., made an incorrect choice) [t
(15) 0 3.4, p 0 .004, two-tailed]; however, the size of this
positive-feedback effect did not vary according to the accura-
cy of the posttestresponse [t(15) 0 0.47, p 0 .6, two-tailed]. In
contrast, for the trials drawn from the four-choice condition,
the size of the positive-feedback effect did vary according to
the accuracy of the posttest response. For accurate posttest
responses, confidence was higher if the participant had re-
ceived positive feedback for the item pair during the scan,
rather than negative feedback [t(15) 0 3.9, p 0 .001, two-
tailed]; for inaccurate posttest responses, neither positive nor
negative feedback during the scan led to differential confi-
dence scores [t(15) 0 0.26, p 0 .8, two-tailed]. Finally,
increases in confidence judgments were associated with
decreases in reaction time; a mixed-model linear regres-
sion analysis of reaction times on confidence, with
Participant as a random factor, showed this effect to
be significant [F(6, 2790) 0 10.0, p <. 0 0 1 ] .
The results from the follow-up posttest that occurred one
week after the scanning session mirrored the results from the
immediate posttest. Performance remained better than chance
for both conditions [t(15) 0 3.2, p 0 .006, for the two-choice
condition;t(15)0 3.1,p0 .007, for the four-choice condition].
A repeated measures three-way ANOVA on the confidence
scores indicated a main effect of feedback type [F(1, 15.3) 0
8.5, p 0 .01], a main effect of posttest accuracy [F(1, 15.3) 0
14.9, p 0 .002], and a Trial Type × Feedback Type interaction
[F(1, 15.7) 0 8.6, p 0 .01]. This pattern is remarkably similar
to that observed for the immediate posttest. Confidence was
highest for accurate trials containing item pairs for which the
participants had received positive feedback during the scan,
and this positive-feedback effect was greatest for the posttest
trials drawn from the four-choice condition. Increases in con-
fidence judgments were again associated with decreases in
reaction times; a mixed-model linear regression analysis of
reaction times on confidence, with Participant as a random
factor, showed this effect to be significant [F(6, 2670) 0 15.2,
p <. 0 0 1 ] .
fMRI results: Trial Type effects
The primary goal of this experiment was to examine how
the amount of information provided by feedback influenced
the way that the feedback was processed by the brain. On
the basis of our previous work with a paired-associate learn-
ing task (Tricomi & Fiez, 2008) and of prior findings in the
literature (Delgado et al., 2005; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen,
2008), we began with an a priori interest in the response
profile of the caudate nucleus. For this reason, we performed
an initial ANOVA on data extracted from a priori ROIs
centered in the left (−12, 8, 12) and right (12, 8, 12) heads
of the caudate nucleus (cf. Zink et al., 2003). In the left
caudate, there were significant main effects of feedback type
[F(1, 15) 0 9.5, p 0 .008] and trial type [F(1, 15) 0 5.8, p 0
.03], with a greater caudate response observed for trials with
positive as compared to negative feedback, and a greater
caudate response in the four-choice as compared to the two-
choice condition (Fig. 3). The trial type effect was also
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Fig. 3 CaudateActivation AcrossConditions. a) The left caudate shows
a feedback type by time interaction in the 4-choice condition (p < 0.001;
contiguity threshold of 41 voxels). The image is left-right reversed. The
green crosshair marked the center of the a prioi ROI used for the analyses
and the graph in Part b. b) Mean intensity of the BOLD response during
the trial outcome phase in the left caudate, using a sphere centered on a
priori Talairach coordinates of (-12, 8, 12; cf. Zink et al., 2003). The
signal is significantly greater following positive feedback than negative
feedbackinthe4-choiceconditionbutnot the2-choicecondition,andthe
signal is significantly greater for negative feedback in the 2-choice
condition than in the 4-choice condition
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Feedback Type × Trial Type interaction approached signif-
icance [F(1, 15) 0 4.3, p 0 .057] in the left caudate, and a
similar (though nonsignificant) pattern was observed in the
right caudate [F(1, 15) 0 1.4, p 0 .25]. Although p was
greater than .05 in the left caudate, we believe that ignoring
this interaction would likely constitute a Type II error, due to
the focal nature of activation in the caudate. Indeed, the size
of the analyzed area was actually somewhat greater than the
defined area, due to the spatial smoothing kernel of 8 mm
FWHM. An alternative approach using a single a priori
voxel, which has been utilized in past work (Cohen et al.,
2002; Tricomi et al., 2004), yielded a Feedback Type × Trial
Type interaction at p 0 .04.
Additionally, within each trial type condition, paired t
tests of outcome phase activation demonstrated that the
signal in the left caudate differed for positive and neg-
ative feedback in the four-choice condition [t(15) 0 3.6,
p 0 .002, two-tailed], but not in the two-choice condi-
tion [t(15) 0 0.5, p 0 .6, two-tailed]. Looking across the
trial type conditions, the signal was significantly greater
for negative-feedback trials from the two-choice as com-
pared to the four-choice condition [left caudate, t(15) 0
3.1, p 0 .008, two-tailed; right caudate, t(15) 0 2.6, p 0
.02, two-tailed], whereas the signals for positive-
feedback trials were comparable across the two-choice
and four-choice conditions [left caudate, t(15) 0 0.04,
p 0 .97, two-tailed; right caudate, t(15) 0 0.37, p 0 .72,
two-tailed]. These results are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that the caudate response to feedback is modulated
by the information value of the feedback (which varied
across the two-choice vs. four-choice conditions for
negative but not for positive feedback).
In order to ascertain the extent of these effects in the
brain, we also performed a repeated measures ANOVA on
the whole-brain data from the four-choice and two-choice
conditions. For the two-choice condition, no regions
showed a differential response to positive and negative
feedback at our significance threshold. However, a number
of regions (listed in Table 1) did exhibit a Feedback Type ×
Time interaction in the four-choice condition; in line with
the results from the a priori analysis, the left head of the
caudate nucleus was one of the identified regions, and it is
depicted in Fig. 3. A similar region in the right head of the
caudate nucleus was detected, but it was smaller (22 voxels)
and did not survive our contiguity threshold.
Several brain regions were identified as showing a Trial
Type × Feedback Type × Time interaction (Table 2). The
largest and most significant cluster that exhibited this effect
was in the left prefrontal cortex. A similar cluster had also
been identified as showing a Feedback Type × Time inter-
action effect in the four-choice condition. The cluster in-
cluded voxels in the dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (PFC), the inferior frontal gyrus, and the anterior
insula. All of the subregions of the activated cluster dis-
played the same pattern of activation; Fig. 4 therefore
depicts the results from the entire cluster showing the
three-way interaction. Within this cluster, the interaction
effect reflected the fact that there was no differentiation
between trials with positive and negative feedback for the
two-choice condition, whereas there was a greater response
to positive than to negative feedback for the four-choice
condition; additionally, the signal following negative feed-
back in the two-choice condition exceeded that signal in the
four-choice condition, whereas the signals following posi-
tive feedback were comparable across conditions.
Table 1 Four-choice condition: Feedback Type × Time (p < .001)
Region of Activation BA Size (#
voxels)
Peak Talairach
Coordinates (x, y, z)
Maximum
F Value
Positive feedback > negative feedback
superior frontal gyrus (midline) 8 73 −4, 29, 48 5.58
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gryus, ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, insula (L)
9, 13, 44, 45,
46, 47
838 −51, 19, 27 11.38
inferior frontal gyrus/ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, insula (R) 13, 45, 47 168 48, 20, 15 8.18
anterior cingulate (bilateral) (decreasing activation)
* 32 109 −4, 36, 18 4.93
inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 71 −48, –56, 42 6.11
middle temporal gyrus (L) 21, 22 147 −58, –38, –3 8.09
caudate nucleus (L) 50 −11, 10, 6 4.93
inferior cerebellum (R) 63 20, –73, –25 5.67
Negative feedback > positive feedback
precuneus (bilateral) (decreasing activation) 31 135 10, –66, 21 6.75
BA, Brodmann area.
*Decreasing activation indicates that the BOLD signal decreases from baseline; hence, a greater response indicates less of a
decrease from baseline for these clusters.
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A secondary aim of the present study was to explore the
links between brain-based measures during the initial encod-
ing of the stimulus items and subsequent behavioral meas-
ures of learning and memory. We focused on two questions
that were motivated by a prior study involving a similar
paired-associate learning task (Tricomi & Fiez, 2008). The
first was whether we could find evidence for a subsequent
memory effect, in which variability in the signal during the
initial encoding of a trial could be shown to predict future
accuracy on a posttest of memory performance. We per-
formed a whole-brain analysis of posttest accuracy (high-
confidence accurate posttest responses vs. incorrect posttest
responses) and time (2-s time periods T1–T10) to investi-
gate this question. Trials from both the two-choice and four-
choice conditions were included, although it should be
noted that there were more trials from the four-choice
condition, since the study was designed with more trials in
this condition, which was also associated with the largest
number of high-confidence responses on the immediate
posttest. Table 3 lists the regions that showed a subsequent
memory (Posttest Accuracy × Time) effect. These areas
showed greater activation on trials in which the subsequent
posttest response was accurate, as compared to inaccurate.
Among the regions displaying this pattern were the left
inferior frontal gyrus, which has previously been associated
with subsequent memory effects (Brewer, Zhao, Desmond,
Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner, Koutstaal, & Schacter,
1999).
The second analysis was motivated by a subsequent
reaction time effect we had observed in our prior work
(Tricomi & Fiez, 2008). In the prior study, an exploratory
analysis found that the level of caudate activation for trials
with positive feedback (i.e., correct trials) predicted the size
of the savings in reaction times to the same stimulus items
Table 2 Trial Type × Feedback Type × Time (p < .001)
Region of Activation BA Size (#
voxels)
Peak Talairach
Coordinates (x, y, z)
Maximum
F Value
Positive feedback > negative feedback for four-choice condition only
superior frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus (bilateral) 6, 8 156 −4, 26, 48 6.76
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus/ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, insula (L)
9, 13, 44, 45,
46, 47
542 −51, 17, 3 10.22
inferior frontal gyrus (ventrolateral PFC) (R) 45, 47 49 48, 20, 9 6.05
inferior parietal lobule (L) 40 73 −45, –59, 42 5.83
BA, Brodmann area.
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Fig. 4 Left Prefrontal Cortex Activation Across Conditions. a)T h el e f t
PFC (circled) shows a Feedback Type by Trial Type by Time interaction
(p < 0.001; contiguity threshold of 41 voxels). The image is left-right
reversed. b) Mean intensity of the BOLD response during the trial
outcome phase in the left prefrontal cortex. There is a significant interac-
tion of Trial Type and Feedback Type, with a greater signal following
positive feedback than negative feedback in the 4-choice condition but
not the 2-choice condition. The signal is also significantly greater for
negative feedback in the 2-choice condition than in the 4-choice condi-
tion. The plot was constructed using data from the entire left PFC cluster
identified in our whole-brain analysis
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work had found that reaction times were significantly cor-
related with confidence ratings, we investigated the relation-
ship between the caudate signal and subsequent confidence
ratings on the posttest. Trials with positive feedback were
first divided into those with high versus low posttest confi-
dence ratings (5–7 vs. 1–3 on a 7-point scale), and then the
outcome phase data extracted from our left- and right-
caudate a priori ROIs were compared with respect to post-
test confidence. In the left caudate, the signal was signifi-
cantly greater for trials with high as compared to low
confidence on the posttest [t(15) 0 2.3, p 0 .04, two-
tailed], and a similar, but nonsignificant, pattern was ob-
served in the right caudate [t(15) 0 1.5, p 0 .14, two-tailed].
A similar analysis was performed for the trials with negative
feedback, which were analyzed separately because in our
prior work we had examined correct trials only. Although
the effect was in the same direction, it was not significant for
either the left caudate [t(15) 0 0.8, p 0 .43, two-tailed] or the
right caudate [t(15) 0 0.43, p 0 .68, two-tailed].
Discussion
In this experiment, positive feedback indicated which an-
swer was correct in both conditions, whereas negative feed-
back provided enough information to determine which
answer was correct for the two-choice condition, but not
the four-choice condition. The signal in the caudate mir-
rored the amount of information provided by feedback, with
greater activation for positive than for negative feedback in
the four-choice condition, but not in the two-choice condi-
tion. In the two-choice condition, negative feedback pro-
duced as strong a signal in the caudate as did positive
feedback. This suggests that the caudate responds to the
informational value of feedback in a manner analogous to
its response to the reward value of an outcome. Thus,
negative feedback in this experiment might not have been
interpreted as a punishment, but rather as a reward that
varied in magnitude depending on the amount of informa-
tion it provided (i.e., small for the four-choice condition and
large for the two-choice condition). The idea that the cau-
date responds to the informational value of feedback would
also help reconcile previous findings of negative feedback
producing an increased striatal response relative to no feed-
back (Bischoff-Grethe, Hazeltine, Bergren, Ivry, & Grafton,
2009), whereas negative feedback often produces a de-
creased striatal response relative to positive feedback (e.g.,
Tricomi et al., 2006).
As in previous work (Brewer et al., 1998; Reber et al.,
2002; Tricomi & Fiez, 2008; Wagner et al., 1998), activation
in regions such as the left inferior frontal gyrus was found to
predict which trials would subsequently be remembered on
the posttest following the scanning session. Additionally, in
this experiment, when positive feedback was delivered, the
caudate was more active for trials that would subsequently
be associated with high posttest confidence. Furthermore,
positive feedback led to higher confidence ratings on the
posttests than did negative feedback, which is in line with
the finding that a greater BOLD signal was elicited in the
caudate for positive than for negative feedback in the four-
choice condition. These results suggest that caudate activa-
tion may play a role in facilitating feedback-based learning,
in accord with mounting evidence indicating that both the
striatum and the declarative memory system can contribute
simultaneouslytolearning(Dickersonetal.,2011;Ma tt fe ld&
Stark, 2011;Sadehetal.,2011;Shohamy,Myers,Kalanithi,&
Gluck, 2008; Tricomi & Fiez, 2008).
One quandary, however, is an apparent mismatch between
the neural versus the behavioral effects of our trial type
manipulation. Neurally, trial type was found to modulate the
signal in the caudate in response to negative feedback (which
differed in information content across the two conditions) but
toproduce little difference in the signalin response topositive
feedback (which had equivalent information value across the
two conditions). Behaviorally, however, trial type dispropor-
tionately affected posttest confidence ratings for trials with
positive feedback, and, as noted above, correlations between
neural activity and subsequent confidence ratings were found
for trials with positive but not with negative feedback. These
findings suggest that a distinction must be made between the
reward value signal and the learning signal produced in the
Table 3 Subsequent memory effects: Posttest Accuracy × Time (p < .001)
Region of Activation BA Size (# voxels) Peak Talairach Coordinates (x, y, z) Maximum F Value
Subsequent high confidence correct responses > incorrect responses
inferior frontal gyrus (L) 10, 47 137 −51, 22, 3 6.68
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (L) 10 59 −8, 55, –3 5.4
middle temporal gyrus (L) (decreasing activation)
* 21 48 −65, –25, –3 4.61
middle occipital gyrus, fusiform gyrus (L) 18 45 −45, –77, –9 4.29
BA, Brodmann area.
*Decreasing activation indicates that the BOLD signal decreases from baseline; hence, a greater response indicates less of a
decrease from baseline for these clusters
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2012) 12:361–372 369caudate. Our results suggest that caudate activation indexes
the subjective reward value of a stimulus, but that the link
between the negative-feedback signal in the caudate and be-
havioral performance is not as tight as the link associated with
positive feedback. It could be that the caudate is more effec-
tive at strengthening associations than at forming negative
associations, or these results could be due to the fact that the
response to negative feedback was not truly an “error” re-
sponse in our experiment. Support for the former conclusion
comes from other studies that have shown that learning rates
and reaction times are faster when positive feedback or mon-
etary rewards are presented than when negative feedback or
punishments are presented (Chase et al., 2010; Kim, Shimojo,
&O ’Doherty, 2006; Wächter, Lungu, Liu, Willingham, &
Ashe, 2009).
The role of the striatal response to negative feedback as a
learning signal remains uncertain. One theory is that learn-
ing from errors depends on the “dip” in firing of dopami-
nergic neurons following negative prediction errors caused
by negative feedback (Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Negative feedback, however, may
not necessarily lead to negative prediction errors. If struc-
tures in the brain’s reward circuitry code for informational
value in a manner similar to the coding for primary reward
value (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka, 2011), negative feed-
back could lead to a positive prediction error if it were to
provide more information than expected. Since the predic-
tion error signals conveyed by dopamine neurons are
thought to have a major influence on striatal activity, it is
unclear whether negative feedback can be more effective in
promoting learning when it produces a decrease rather than
an increase in striatal signal. It is possible that a “reward”
response produced by negative feedback could actually lead
to reinforcement of the incorrect response. Alternatively, if
people are able to flexibly use the information provided by
negative feedback, a positive striatal response to negative
feedback could still support accurate learning, presumably
in conjunction with other regions involved in learning, such
as the prefrontal cortex and the medial temporal lobe.
Indeed, the results of our study indicate that the caudate
is not acting in isolation in its involvement in feedback-
based learning. Other regions, such as the left PFC, were
also sensitive to the amount of information provided by
feedback. A smaller PFC response was elicited in response
to negative than to positive feedback in the four-choice
condition, whereas there was no differentiation in the two-
choice condition. Such a pattern of activation does not
necessarily mean that the specific role of the left PFC is to
code for the amount of information provided by feedback.
Instead, the pattern could simply reflect the increased pro-
cessing demands that occur when more information is avail-
able. For example, the dorsolateral PFC has been associated
with a role in executive control processes, such as working
memory, and it may be that with more information, there is
an increased load on this system as it updates memory
representations. The involvement of multiple memory sys-
tems could explain the interactive influences of trial type,
feedback type, and memory accuracy on confidence ratings.
For instance, variations in the amount of elaborative pro-
cessing that is supported by regions such as the PFC in the
two-choice versus the four-choice conditions could yield
variations in the ability to recall specific episodic experien-
ces that particularly bolster the confidence ratings for accu-
rate memory judgments. On the other hand, the delivery of
positive feedback may help to create stimulus–response
associations that bolster stimulus familiarity, and subse-
quently confidence ratings, independent of whether the re-
call of a prior episodic experience with the stimulus was
accurate or inaccurate.
In summary, the results of this experiment build upon
previous research by demonstrating the strong role that
context plays in guiding feedback-related caudate activa-
tion. The value of the outcome of one’s actions is deter-
mined relative to one’s current goals, and caudate activity
reflects this (Grahn et al., 2008; Han et al., 2010; Tricomi &
Fiez, 2008). Critically, in the four-choice condition of this
experiment, positive and negative feedback carried different
amounts of information, and thereby could be perceived by
learners as aiding them in reaching their goal of task mastery
to different degrees, leading to differential caudate activity.
When negative feedback provided as much information as
positive feedback, the two types of feedback elicited similar
signals in the caudate. This implies that there can be positive
aspects of “negative” feedback and suggests that the subjective
value of the information provided by feedback must be taken
into account when developing models of the neural mecha-
nisms supporting learning and motivation. Additionally, our
results suggest that declarative memory processing is influ-
enced by the magnitude of the positive feedback signal in the
caudate. Feedback processing in the caudate may thus be
important for both episodic and nonepisodic forms of memory.
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